Date Feb 15, 2024 10:00:00 AM

MiTM phishing attack can let attackers unlock and steal a Tesla

In March 2024, security researchers demonstrated a Man-in-the-Middle (MiTM) Phishing attack on Tesla, where attackers set up fake Wi-Fi networks named "Tesla Guest" to mimic official networks. When users connected, they were redirected to a fake login page, and their credentials, including two-factor authentication codes, were captured. With these credentials, attackers could log into the Tesla app and add a new "Phone Key," enabling them to unlock and start the car, risking vehicle theft.

MiTM Phishing Attack

Implications

This attack highlights significant risks, including vehicle theft, data breaches, and potential damage to Tesla's reputation. It also underscores broader security concerns for connected vehicles in the automotive industry.

Recommendations

Tesla users should verify Wi-Fi networks, check website URLs for legitimacy, enable strong two-factor authentication, monitor account activity, and keep software updated to mitigate risks.

Comprehensive Analysis of the MiTM Phishing Attack on Tesla

This section provides a detailed analysis of the MiTM Phishing attack on Tesla that was reported in March 2024, focusing on the incident's mechanics, implications, and recommendations for mitigation.

Understanding the Incident

In March 2024, security researchers Talal Haj Bakry and Tommy Mysk from Mysk Inc. demonstrated a concerning vulnerability in Tesla's security system through a Man-in-theMiddle (MiTM) Phishing attack. This attack was detailed in several reports, including a notable article published on March 7, 2024, by Bleeping Computer, which highlighted how attackers could compromise Tesla accounts to unlock and start vehicles

The attack leverages the trust users place in familiar Wi-Fi networks, particularly at Tesla service centers or charging stations. The researchers found that attackers could set up a fake Wi-Fi network named "Tesla Guest," an SSID commonly associated with Tesla's official networks. When a Tesla user connects to this network, they are redirected to a counterfeit login page that closely resembles Tesla's official login page. This page captures the user's credentials, including email, password, and any two-factor authentication codes, allowing the attacker to gain unauthorized access to the user's Tesla account.

With the captured credentials, the attacker can log into the Tesla app and add a new "Phone Key" to the vehicle. The Phone Key is a feature that allows users to use their smartphones as digital keys to unlock and start their Tesla cars. Once added, the attacker can use their own smartphone to unlock and start the car, effectively enabling vehicle theft.

This process was demonstrated using a Flipper Zero device, but the researchers noted that other devices, such as a Raspberry Pi or Android phones, could also be used, making the attack relatively accessible.







Detailed Incident Analysis

To understand the attack's mechanics, consider the following steps, as outlined in various reports:

Step Description
Set Up Fake Wi-Fi Network Attackers create a Wi-Fi network named "Tesla Guest," mimicking official Tesla networks.
User Connection Tesla users connect to the fake network, believing it to be legitimate, especially at service centers.
Redirect to Fake Login Page The network redirects users to a fake login page that looks identical to Tesla's official page.
Capture Credentials Users enter their email, password, and two-factor authentication codes, which are captured by the attacker.
Access Tesla Account With captured credentials, the attacker logs into the user's Tesla account.
Add New Phone Key The attacker adds a new Phone Key to the vehicle, enabling them to unlock and start the car.

This table illustrates the attack chain, highlighting how each step builds on the previous one to achieve the attacker's goal of vehicle theft. The use of caller ID spoofing and the familiarity of the "Tesla Guest" network significantly increase the attack's success rate, as users are less likely to question the legitimacy of the connection.

Broader Trends and Implications

Recent statistics underscore the growing threat of Phishing attacks on connected devices, including vehicles. For instance, a 2024 report by DMARC Report noted nearly 5 million Phishing attacks in 2023, with a continued upward trend, emphasizing the need for robust security measures. The Tesla incident is particularly alarming because it demonstrates how Phishing can directly impact physical assets, such as vehicles, rather than just digital data.


The implications of this attack are multifaceted:

  • Vehicle Theft : The most immediate risk is the potential for attackers to steal Tesla cars, which could lead to significant financial losses for owners and insurance companies.
  • Data Breach : Attackers gaining access to Tesla accounts may also compromise personal information, vehicle data, and other sensitive details, increasing the risk of identity theft or further cyberattacks.
  • Reputation Damage : If this vulnerability is exploited widely, it could damage Tesla's reputation, eroding customer trust in the security of their vehicles. This is particularly critical for Tesla, given its leadership in the electric vehicle market.
  • Industry-Wide Concerns : The attack highlights broader security risks associated with connected vehicles, potentially affecting the entire automotive industry. As vehicles become more integrated with digital systems, the attack surface for cybercriminals expands, necessitating industry-wide security standards.

The researchers' use of a Flipper Zero device to set up the fake Wi-Fi network is noteworthy. This device, known for its versatility in security testing, underscores how accessible such attacks can be.

How ZiSoft Shields Against MiTM Phishing Attacks Targeting Tesla Vehicles

To safeguard Tesla users and the automotive industry from Man-in-the-Middle (MiTM) phishing attacks, it is crucial to adopt proactive cybersecurity measures. ZiSoft, an AIpowered cybersecurity awareness platform, enhances protection through comprehensive training, simulations, and analytics.

  • Circle Check
    Verify Network Connections to Avoid Rogue Access Points.
    Cybercriminals set up fake Wi-Fi hotspots at charging stations to intercept login credentials. Tesla users should only connect to verified networks provided by Tesla .

    How ZiSoft Helps: ZiSoft’s Learning Management System (LMS) and AWAREA mobile app educate users on identifying suspicious networks and avoiding deceptive Wi-Fi traps, reducing the risk of compromised credentials
  • Circle Check
    Scrutinize Website URLs to Avoid Phishing Attempts.
    Before entering credentials, users must verify they are on the official Tesla website (tesla.com) or the Tesla mobile app. Attackers often use fake URLs like tesla-freewifi.co to steal login information.

    How ZiSoft Helps: ZiSoft’s Phishing Simulation module trains users to recognize URL discrepancies, while AI-driven analytics assess user vulnerabilities, ensuring continuous awareness improvement
  • Circle Check
    Enhance Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for Stronger Security.
    Since attackers can intercept SMS-based 2FA codes, Tesla users should opt for authenticator apps or hardware security keys for added protection.

    How ZiSoft Helps: ZiSoft’s AWAREA mobile app provides on-to-go guidance to learn anywhere anytime on setting up secure MFA, reinforced by phishing simulations that expose weaknesses in authentication methods.
  • Circle Check
    Monitor Account Activity for Unauthorized Access.
    Users should regularly check their Tesla accounts for suspicious activity, such as unexpected Phone Keys being added, and set up security alerts for account changes.

    How ZiSoft Helps: ZiSoft’s Cyber Emissaries Module empowers organizations to build a culture of vigilance, encouraging users to actively monitor their accounts and report anomalies.
  • Circle Check
    Keep Software and Security Measures Up to Date.
    Tesla users should always update their mobile apps and vehicle firmware to ensure they receive the latest security patches.

    How ZiSoft Helps: ZiSoft’s ZI-Workshop provides structured training on the importance of software updates, ensuring users understand the risks of outdated security measures.

For the automotive industry, broader measures include:

  • Enhanced Authentication : Implement more robust authentication methods for adding new Phone Keys, such as requiring physical presence or additional verification steps.
  • User Education : Provide regular security awareness training for users to recognize Phishing attempts and verify network legitimacy, by using
  • Industry Standards : Develop and enforce security standards for connected vehicles to reduce vulnerabilities across the sector.

Why This Attack Is Particularly Concerning

This attack is particularly concerning due to its combination of Phishing and MiTM tactics, exploiting both user trust and technical vulnerabilities. The use of a familiar network name like "Tesla Guest" leverages social engineering, making it harder for users to detect the fraud. Additionally, the attack's reliance on relatively simple hardware, such as a Flipper Zero, means it is accessible to a wide range of attackers, not just highly skilled hackers.

Conclusion

The MiTM Phishing attack on Tesla in March 2024 underscores the critical need for robust security measures in connected vehicles. The attack's ability to enable vehicle theft through captured credentials and added Phone Keys highlights the evolving nature of cyber threats. While Tesla users can take steps to protect themselves, the industry's response, including Tesla's, must evolve to address such vulnerabilities effectively. Continuous security assessment and improvement even by using solutions like the “ZiSoft Solution” are essential to safeguard consumers from these growing risks

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